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Abstract
The European debt crisis that followed the global financial crisis, erupting first with Greece,
then Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain, has threatened the very existence of the Euro zone.
In this paper we examine the evolution of dynamic co-movements of sovereign bond yield
spreads (BYS) in the Euro zone and the role of credit rating agency downgrades on those
co-movements. Estimation results from a multivariate DCC-GARCH model on daily BYS
data for nine Euro zone countries over the period 2007-2012 suggest an inverted U-shaped
curve of BYS co-movements during the period of the financial and debt crisis. Credit rating
downgrades by major rating agencies indicate rather idiosyncratic patterns of government
bond yield spreads co-movements within and between the Euro zone periphery and the core.
Keywords: Government bond yield spreads, credit rating agencies, dynamic conditional
correlations, Euro zone sovereign debt crisis
JEL codes: C32; E43; G12; G24
1. Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that the extent of the Euro zone bond markets’ integration
has been affected by the latest global financial crisis and Euro zone debt crisis. The dis-
integration of the euro area bond markets during the financial and debt crisis has already
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been mentioned, for example, by Pozzi and Wolswijk (2012). A two-speed Euro zone seems
to have been the result of the ongoing crisis, with the highly synchronized bond markets
for countries in the Euro zone core on the one hand, and the decoupled bond markets for
countries in the periphery on the other.
In addition, the Euro zone sovereign debt crisis has drawn considerable attention to
the role of credit rating agencies. Sovereign ratings, especially for countries in the Euro
zone periphery, became under persistent downgrade pressure, as a consequence of increased
government deficits and debt levels, and sluggish economic growth. The role of credit rating
agencies on government bond yields and on financial markets has been studied extensively
(see, for instance Afonso et al., 2012; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2011; Chiang et al., 2007;
Hull et al., 2004, and references therein).
However, empirically, little is known about the extent of government bond yield spreads
co-movements in the Euro zone during the latest financial and debt crisis, and the role of
credit rating agencies on those BYS co-movements. The extent of Euro zone bond market
co-movements merits closer investigation, as it may have serious implications for the cost
of financing fiscal deficits, bond portfolio diversification, the modelling and forecasting of
long-term interest rates, and monetary policymaking independence.
Among the few relevant studies on BYS co-movements in the Euro zone during the
latest crisis are those of Dias (2012), Gilmore et al. (2010) and Boysen-Hogrefe (2013). The
former two studies use a minimum spanning tree approach to examine co-movements in
government bond yields based on rolling windows. Gilmore et al. (2010) uses monthly data
on 10-year government bond yields over the period July 1993 – September 2008 and find
an increased correlation between EU bond markets. Dias (2012) examines co-movements
of daily 10-year government bond yields between nineteen EU countries over the period of
April 2007 – October 2010. The author finds evidence of asynchronization of bond yields
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in the Euro zone and the formation of two distinct groups of euro countries, namely, those
in the periphery and those in the core, with the deepening of the government bond crisis.
Boysen-Hogrefe (2013), using a dynamic factor model with time varying loadings over the
period January 2007 – May 2012, finds that co-movements between euro zone bond returns
in the core were highly synchronized, while bond markets in the periphery have decoupled.
The result is attributed to the fact that the latter countries have received full assistance
from rescue packages of the EU, European countries, and the IMF.
The aim of this paper is to contribute towards the study of government bond yield
spreads synchronization dynamics during the latest financial and Euro zone debt crisis by
using a more elaborate measure of government bond yield co-movements. To achieve that,
we construct a time-varying measure of sovereign bond yield spread correlations based on
the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002), and extend the sample
up to 2012. Taking into account both time variation and conditional heterogeneity in BYS
correlations, this measure has several advantages compared to other commonly used mea-
sures. First, it is able to distinguish negative correlations due to episodes in single years,
synchronous behavior during stable years and asynchronous behavior in turbulent years.
Second, unlike rolling windows (an alternative way to capture time variability), the pro-
posed measure does not suffer from the so called “ghost features”, as the effects of a shock
are not reflected in m consecutive periods, with m being the window span. Finally, under
the proposed measure there is neither need to set a window span, nor loss of observations,
nor subsample estimation required.
Our results are based on daily data over the period March 3, 2007 – June 18, 2012 and
suggest an inverted U-shaped curve of sovereign bond yield spreads co-movements during
the latest financial and Euro zone debt crisis. In addition, credit rating downgrades by the
major credit rating agencies have a heterogenous pattern on sovereign bond yield spread
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correlations. Specifically, increased bond diversification benefits are evident within the core,
and between the periphery and the core, while reduced bond diversification benefits are
found within the periphery.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodol-
ogy and describes the data used. Section 3 presents the empirical findings, and Section 4
summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. Methodology and Data
Let yt = [y1t, y2t, ..., y9t]
′ be a 9 × 1 vector of government bond yield spreads return series,
defined as the first difference between the 10-year government bond yields of nine Euro zone
countries, namely Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands (ABFN or Euro zone core,
hereafter), and Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS or Euro zone periphery,
henceforward), and the German government bond yields of the same maturity.1 Data on
sovereign bond yields (in basis points) are obtained from Bloomberg database and the sample
ranges from March 3, 2007 to June 18, 2012 (1163 observations), thus covering the turbulent
period during the global financial and Euro zone debt-crisis.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the 10-year government bond yield spreads (raw series) in
the ABFN (upper panel) and the GIIPS (middle panel), along with the actual credit rating
downgrade events (lower panel) by the three major rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s,
Moody’s and Fitch Rating). According to this figure, an increasing trend emerges until the
beginning of 2009 followed by a declining trend till the end of 2009. Thereafter, deteriorating
macroeconomic fundamentals in the peripheral countries led to increasing government bond
yields spreads in both the peripherals and the core Euro zone countries. In addition, spreads
1In this paper, use the terms government bond yield spreads and government bond yield spreads returns
interchangeably, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise.
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in the Euro zone periphery are, on average, tenfold those found in the Euro zone core.
Interestingly, credit rating agencies downgrades seem to be associated with simultaneous
increases in BYS in both the periphery and the core Euro zone, a point that we explore
further below.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the government BYS series and their first dif-
ferences in each country. Results for the raw series in Panel A indicate that, on average,
BYS are higher in the periphery compared to those in the Euro zone core. The maximum
value government bond yield spreads reached was 31.9 basis points in Greece, followed by
Portugal (14.81), Ireland (12.16), Spain (5.71) and Italy (5.51). In the remaining countries
(the ABFN), BYS did not exceed the 3.55 basis point threshold on any given day during
our sample. Moreover, the raw series are found to be non-stationary for each country as the
ADF test cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root.
Turning to the results obtained for the (stationary) first difference of BYS series in
each country, the picture remains qualitatively similar. That is, the Euro zone periphery is
experiencing substantially larger changes in BYS than the Eurozone core. Looking at the
unconditional correlations of BYS returns we observe that pairwise correlations are higher
for countries within each group, that is, within the periphery and within the core than for
countries between these two groups. For instance, the highest correlations exist between
Italy and Spain (0.8041), Austria and France (0.7357) and Belgium and France (0.7009),
while the lowest exist between Greece and the Netherlands (0.1276) and Greece and France
(0.1484), suggesting two distinct groups: the one consisting of the countries in the periphery
and the other comprising the countries in the Euro zone core.2
In order to examine the evolution of co-movement of sovereign government bond yield
2However, the correlation between Italy and Spain seem to be an outlier, as the average correlation within
the periphery is 0.625, and the respective figure within the core is 0.408.
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spreads within and between the periphery and the core, we obtain a time-varying measure
of BYS correlations based on the DCC model of Engle (2002). The estimation of the
DCC model involves two steps: first, each conditional variance is specified as a univariate
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) process and second,
the standardized residuals from the first step are used to construct the conditional correlation
matrix.
The conditional mean equations are represented by the following reduced-form VAR:
A(L)yt = εt, where εt|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0, Ht), and t = 1, ..., T (1)
where A is a matrix, L the lag operator and εt is the vector of innovations based on the
information set, Ω, available at time t − 1. The εt vector has the following conditional
variance-covariance matrix:
Ht = DtRtDt, (2)
where Dt = diag
√
hit is a 9 × 9 matrix containing the time-varying standard deviations
obtained from univariate GARCH models and Rt = ρij t where i, j = 1, 2, ..., 9 is the 9 × 9
matrix comprising the conditional correlations. The standard deviations in matrix Dt follow
a univariate process of:
hit = ωi +
Pi∑
p=1
αipε
2
it−p +
Qi∑
q=1
βiqhit−q, for i = 1, 2, ..., 9. (3)
The DCC model of Engle (2002) has the following structure:
Rt = Q
∗−1
t QtQ
∗−1
t , (4)
where
Qt = (1−
K∑
k=1
ak −
L∑
l=1
bl)Q¯+
K∑
k=1
ak(εt−kεt−k) +
L∑
l=1
blQt−l, (5)
Q¯ is the unconditional variance-covariance matrix from estimating the model in equation
3, and Q∗t is a 9 × 9 diagonal matrix containing the square root of the diagonal elements
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of Qt. Our main focus is on the time-varying conditional correlations ρij =
qij,t√
qii,tqjj,t
, where
i, j = 1, 2, ..., 9, in matrix Rt.
The DCC model is estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator under the
multivariate student’s t distribution as the normality assumption of the residuals is rejected.
3. Estimation Results
Table 2 reports the results of the DCC model. According to this table, all dynamic condi-
tional correlations are highly significant. Interestingly, the estimated correlations are larger
within the core Euro zone (ABFN) countries compared to the countries within the periph-
ery (GIIPS). For example, estimated government bond yield spreads correlations within the
core range between 0.63 (Austria and Belgium) and 0.83 (Netherlands and France), while
only between 0.23 (Greece and Ireland) and 0.66 (Italy and Spain) within the periphery.
Estimated correlation between the core and the periphery vary more substantially between
the very low, albeit still significant, 0.18 (Netherlands and Greece) and 0.64 (Belgium and
Spain). Put differently, we identify two distinct groups of countries: the one group consist-
ing of the highly synchronized countries in the Euro zone core (with an average within-core
correlation of 0.70) and a second group with the relatively less synchronized countries in
the Euro zone periphery (with an average within-periphery correlation of 0.40). This result
is in line with Dias (2012) and Gilmore et al. (2010). The between periphery and the core
average conditional correlations lie in-between the previous two groups with a value of 0.45.
Notice that the DCC model is well specified, as the multivariate versions of the Portman-
teau statistic of Hosking (1980) and Li and McLeod (1981) do not reject the null hypothesis
of no serial correlation in the standardized and squared-standardized residuals, respectively,
for up to 10 lags.
Figure 2 presents the estimated pairwise dynamic conditional correlations from the DCC
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model within and between countries in the Euro zone periphery and the core. Apart from
the large observed heterogeneity in fluctuations, dynamic correlations seem to follow an
inverted U-shaped curve. Specifically, correlations reveal an increasing trend since the be-
ginning of our sample; especially since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008
(fall of Lehman Brothers), until the beginning of 2010. Thereafter, correlations, on average,
gradually declined till the summer of 2012, indicating decoupling effects in the Euro zone
bond markets during the ongoing debt crisis.
Given these initial observations of BYS correlation dynamics during the global financial
crisis and the Euro zone debt-ridden crisis from Figure 2, we now examine whether (and
how) actual credit rating downgrades of Euro zone countries by the major three credit rating
agencies exert an influence on dynamic correlations on government bond yield spreads. To
accomplish that, we apply a Fisher transformation on the estimated dynamic correlations,
ρij,t, between countries i and j according to DCij,t = log((1 + ρij,t)/(1 − ρij,t)), so as to
ensure our dependent variable is not confined to the interval [−1, 1],3 and estimate panel
regressions of the form
DCij,t = αij + βTrend+ γCRijm,t + ij,t, (6)
where αij are cross-section fixed-effects, Trend is a linear time trend, CRt is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if a credit rating agency downgrades a country’s credit rating in
our sample, and 0 otherwise. In total, since March 3 2007 and until June 18 2012, there
were 74 credit rating downgrades for the countries in our sample from the three agencies.
The Netherlands is the only country in our sample that has not been downgraded during
the period of our investigation. Among the three rating agencies, Moody’s was the most
active agency with 35 downgrades, while Fitch and Standard and Poor’s had only 20 and
19, respectively.
3The results are not sensitive to this transformation though.
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Table 3 presents the results of the various forms of model (6). Under Columns (1)-(4) we
examine the overall-effects on dynamic conditional correlations of credit rating downgrades.
Put differently, we do not differentiate between (or within) the core and the periphery at this
point, but rather we ask about the effects on the pairwise correlations in the Euro zone as a
whole. According to column (1) of Table 3, credit rating downgrades of Euro zone countries
by all three credit rating agencies are, on average, associated with significant reductions in
government yield spreads co-movements within the Euro zone. Nevertheless, credit rating
downgrades by individual credit rating agencies suggest rather heterogeneous effects on
dynamic correlations. Under column (2) we include three dummy variables, i.e. one for each
of the three agencies, each of which is equal to 1 if a agency k (where k = Standard & Poor′s,
Moody′s, F itch) downgrades the rating of a country, and 0 otherwise. According to column
(2) of Table 3, credit rating downgrades by individual rating agencies have heterogenous
effects on BYS co-movements. Specifically, credit rating downgrades by Standard & Poor’s
and Fitch are associated with a significant decline in BYS co-movements, while downgrades
by Moody’s lead to a significant, albeit quantitatively small, increase in BYS co-movements
within the Euro zone. This results might be attributed to the variation in credit quality
assessment by the major rating agencies (see, for instance Hill et al., 2010).
Given these initial results, we now explore whether credit rating downgrades of countries
in the periphery or the core have a different outcome on dynamic correlations in the Euro
zone. To achieve that, we introduce two dummy variables, CRGIIPS and CRABFN , which are
equal to 1 if any of the three agencies downgraded any of the countries within the periphery
and within the core respectively, and 0 otherwise. According to column (3) of Table 3, credit
rating downgrades of countries within the periphery and within the core lead to significant
declines in dynamic correlations in the Euro zone. These results remain very similar for
credit rating downgrades of specific countries by the 3 rating agencies. These results are
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presented under column (4) of Table 3. Specifically, we find that credit rating downgrades in
Greece, Spain, Austria and Belgium lead to a decline in BYS correlations, while in Ireland
they lead to an increase in BYS in the Euro zone. For the remaining countries the estimated
parameters are not statistically significant. Summing up, there is evidence of decoupling
effects in sovereign bond yield spreads in the Euro zone as a whole indicating increased
bond diversification benefits in the Euro zone.
However, results on the overall dynamic correlations might mask several empirical regu-
larities specific to each countries group’s pairwise correlations. In order to examine whether
the impact of credit rating downgrades is different on dynamic correlation within the core,
within the periphery, and between the periphery and the core, we repeat the analysis for each
of these three groups and present the results under columns (5)-(8), (9)-(12) and (13)-(16),
respectively.
These results reveal a more clear-cut pattern. Specifically, credit rating downgrades
lead to a reduction of government bond yield spread co-movements within the core (results
under columns (5)-(6)) and between the periphery and the core (results under columns (13)-
(16)). However, the effects of credit rating downgrades on dynamic correlations within the
periphery reveal a rather heterogenous pattern. In particular, credit rating downgrades (on
average) lead to an increase in correlations within the periphery. This result holds when we
either pool credit rating agencies, CR, under column (9) or even when we include specific
dummy variables for each of the three rating agencies under column (10). In the latter case,
downgrades by the Fitch rating agency do not have a significant effect on BYS correlations
within the periphery. Conversely, credit rating downgrades of countries within the periphery
and within the core lead to differentiated effects on the dynamic correlation of BYS within
the periphery. In particular, downgrades of countries within the periphery, CRGIIPS, leads
to a significant increase in dynamic correlations within the periphery, while downgrades of
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countries within the core, CRABFN , lead to a significant decline in dynamic correlations
within the periphery (results under column (11)). These results are further supported when
we introduce country-specific credit downgrade dummy variables. Specifically, credit rating
downgrades of Ireland, Portugal and Spain lead to an increase in BYS co-movements within
the periphery, while credit rating downgrades of Austria and Belgium lead to a decline in
BYS correlation within the periphery. Estimated parameters for credit rating downgrades
of the remaining countries are correctly signed, albeit insignificant.
Summing up, our results reveal an increasing separation of the two groups of Euro zone
countries (the highly synchronized core and the relatively less synchronized periphery) with
the deepening of the Euro zone debt crisis. Nevertheless, credit rating downgrades by major
rating agencies seem to have contributed to closing this gap between these two groups of
countries by reducing co-movements of BYS in the former group and increasing BYS co-
movements in the latter.
As a robustness analysis, we repeated the estimation with the correlation between con-
temporaneous sovereign government bond yield spreads and lagged credit rating downgrades
announcements, so as to let the announcement materialize in the markets. In addition, leads
of the credit rating downgrades variables have been employed as a proxy for watch signals,
or announcements of upcoming downgrades by rating agencies,4 and to account for any pos-
sible reverse causality between BYS correlation and credit rating downgrades. Our results
remain qualitatively identical.
4. Conclusion
The Euro zone debt crisis that followed the global financial crisis led to extraordinary
4Previous studies suggest that outlook and watch signals by rating agencies are at least as important as
rating changes in their market impact (see, for instance, Afonso et al., 2012; Hill and Faff, 2010; Sy, 2004;
Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002)
11
measures by governments and central banks to prevent a potential collapse of the Euro
zone. Given the debt crisis was accompanied by a slowdown in economic activity, the
impact of fiscal consolidation has been limited, and many Euro zone countries (especially
in the periphery) face rising threat to their long-term sustainability. Fears of further fiscal
worsening in the periphery, given the degree of interdependencies between the Euro zone
periphery and the core, have led international markets start to request higher sovereign risk
premia – not only in the Euro zone periphery, but also in the core since the beginning of
the debt crisis. Credit rating agencies interventions during the same period might have also
contributed to the extend of sovereign bond yield spreads co-movements in the Euro zone.
This paper has examined the extent of dynamic correlations of sovereign bond yield
spreads in the Euro zone periphery and the core during the latest global financial and
Euro zone debt crisis, along with the role of credit rating agency downgrades on those
co-movements. Estimation results from a multivariate DCC-GARCH model on daily BYS
data for nine Euro zone countries over the period 2007-2012 suggested an inverted U-shaped
curve of BYS co-movements during the period of the financial and debt crisis. In addition,
two distinct groups of countries were identified: the one group consisting of the highly
synchronized countries in the Euro zone core (with an average within-core correlation of
0.70) and the second group with the relatively less synchronized countries in the Euro zone
periphery (with an average within-periphery correlation of 0.40).
Credit rating downgrades by major rating agencies indicated rather idiosyncratic patterns
of government bond yield spreads co-movements within and between the Euro zone periphery
and the core. Overall, increasing benefits of bond portfolio diversification were identified
under the period of our investigation in the Euro zone arising from actual credit rating
downgrades by major rating agencies; apart from the case of rating downgrades in the
periphery wherein diversification benefits declined.
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Figure 1: Sovereign bond yield spreads and credit rating agencies downgrades
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of 10-year government bond yield spreads
Panel A: Raw series
AUT BEL FRA NED GRC IRL ITL PRT ESP
Mean 0.5012 0.7967 0.4145 0.2882 6.8689 2.6463 1.4511 3.0689 1.3752
Std 0.3416 0.6400 0.3454 0.1728 8.5908 2.7256 1.2601 3.6019 1.2915
Min 0.0330 0.0480 0.0300 0.0200 0.2000 -0.4520 0.1880 0.1120 0.0340
Max 1.6920 3.5540 1.7350 0.8650 31.903 12.162 5.5070 14.814 5.7070
ADF -0.0202 -1.5780 -0.0133 -0.0227 -0.3155 -0.0083 -0.0023 -0.0046 0.0088
Panel B: First differences
AUT BEL FRA NED GRC IRL ITL PRT ESP
Mean 0.0718 0.1428 0.0985 0.0441 2.0626 0.5015 0.3806 0.7495 0.4871
Std 3.8565 6.2993 3.7670 2.2584 55.605 15.051 9.5969 20.225 9.2338
Min -25.900 -29.900 -24.200 -12.200 -1440.7 -136.80 -93.700 -238.60 -99.400
Max 35.200 63.400 22.500 17.500 443.20 133.80 66.600 202.70 65.800
ADF -30.81** -31.12** -34.06** -32.04** -31.12** -28.11** -36.39** -32.59** -33.11**
Unconditional Correlations
AUT 1.0000
BEL 0.7006 1.0000
FRA 0.7357 0.7009 1.0000
NED 0.5798 0.4676 0.5654 1.0000
GRC 0.1667 0.2218 0.1484 0.1276 1.0000
IRL 0.2942 0.4269 0.2872 0.1928 0.2733 1.0000
ITL 0.5251 0.6932 0.5960 0.4111 0.1963 0.4691 1.0000
PRT 0.2427 0.3591 0.2635 0.1820 0.2304 0.5311 0.4571 1.0000
ESP 0.5373 0.6625 0.5462 0.4469 0.2169 0.4794 0.8041 0.4177 1.0000
Note: ADF denotes augmented Dickey Fuller tests with 5% (1%) critical values of -2.86 (-3.44). * and **
indicate significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2: Estimation results of AR(5)-DCC-GARCH model, Period: 3.03.2007–18.06.2012
ρ AUT BEL FRA NED GRC IRL ITL PRT
AUT
BEL 0.6259**
(0.0348)
FRA 0.6682** 0.6912**
(0.0330) (0.0333)
NED 0.7001** 0.6776** 0.8294**
(0.0387) (0.0395) (0.0348)
GRC 0.2668** 0.3314** 0.2416** 0.1751**
(0.0431) (0.0387) (0.0414) (0.0436)
IRL 0.3535** 0.4280** 0.3259** 0.3140** 0.2260**
(0.0502) (0.0464) (0.0504) (0.0530) (0.0477)
ITL 0.5505** 0.6187** 0.5471** 0.5671** 0.3310** 0.4294**
(0.0399) (0.0345) (0.0382) (0.0418) (0.0446) (0.0433)
PRT 0.5054** 0.5303** 0.4592** 0.4953** 0.3284** 0.3723** 0.5306**
(0.0400) (0.0388) (0.0407) (0.0410) (0.0451) (0.0454) (0.0373)
ESP 0.5606** 0.6427** 0.5517** 0.5948** 0.2357** 0.4084** 0.6550** 0.5242**
(0.0368) (0.0351) (0.0382) (0.0432) (0.0455) (0.0449) (0.0303) (0.0351)
α 0.0072** (0.0016)
β 0.9861** (0.0040)
df 2.3256** (0.0264)
Log-Lik -23877.77
H(10) 565.956 [0.76]
H2(10) 666.859 [0.99]
Li−McL(10) 566.369 [0.75]
Li−McL2(10) 668.151 [0.99]
Note: H(10), H2(10) and Li −McL(10), Li −McL2(10) are the multivariate Portmanteau statistics of
Hosking (1980) and Li and McLeod (1981), respectively, up to 10 lags. Standard Errors in parenthesis and
p-values in square brackets. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent level,
respectively.
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